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BALANCING SORNA AND THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT: THE CASE FOR A 
“RESTRICTED CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC” 
APPROACH 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is in place to 
protect the public, children especially, from sex offenders.  Under SORNA, 
anyone and everyone convicted of what the law defines as a “sex offense” is 
required to register as a “sex offender,” providing accurate and up-to-date 
information on where they live, work, and go to school.  Failure to do so 
constitutes a federal crime punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.  But 
how do federal courts determine whether a particular state-level criminal 
offense constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA?  Oftentimes when doing 
comparisons between state and federal law for sentencing purposes, federal 
courts apply what is known as the “categorical approach,”  which involves the 
courts comparing the elements of the prior state-level offense to those of a 
generic federal offense to determine whether there is a categorical match 
between the two.  But in the context of SORNA, more and more federal courts 
are looking beyond the bare elements of a prior state-level conviction to the 
facts underlying the conviction and using that information to determine whether 
the defendant before them is indeed a “sex offender” under SORNA.  This 
Comment argues that, while federal sentencing courts may indeed be entitled 
to look past the bare elements of the prior offense in certain SORNA cases, 
looking to anything beyond facts that were already admitted by the defendant 
in a prior proceeding could raise Sixth Amendment concerns.  Therefore, this 
Comment recommends the adoption of new approach to statutory comparison, 
a “restricted circumstance-specific approach,” that would appropriately 
balance those Sixth Amendment concerns with Congress’s intent that SORNA 
protect the public from sex offenders.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On October 22, 1989, an eleven-year-old boy named Jacob Wetterling was 
riding his bike along a country road in St. Joseph, Minnesota with his best friend 
and younger brother when a masked man pulled up alongside them, took Jacob 
at gunpoint, and ordered the other two boys to leave and not look back.1  Jacob 
 
1. See Pam Louwagie & Jennifer Brooks, Danny Heinrich Confesses to Abducting and Killing 
Jacob Wetterling, STAR TRIBUNE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/danny-heinrich-
confesses-to-abducting-and-killing-jacob-wetterling/392438361/ [https://perma.cc/67HD-UK2A]; 
Erik Ortiz, Man Admits to Abducting, Killing Jacob Wetterling, Missing Minnesota Boy in 1989, NBC 
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-admits-abducting-killing-jacob-
wetterling-missing-minnesota-boy-1989-n643506 [https://perma.cc/VN8T-FG5A]; William Plummer 
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was never seen alive again, and his case remained unsolved for twenty-seven 
years.2  In 1994, in response to several high profile attacks on children like 
Jacob by individuals with prior sex offenses, Congress enacted the first national 
legislation targeting sex offenders specifically, which it named the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders 
Registration Act (the Wetterling Act).3  This law mandated that states create 
their own sex offender registries or else risk losing 10% of their federal 
funding.4   
The Wetterling Act was followed by “Megan’s Law”5 in 1996, which 
required community notification about registered sex offenders in addition to 
the Wetterling Act’s registration requirements.6  Megan’s Law’s namesake was 
a seven-year-old girl named Megan Kanka who was sexually assaulted and 
murdered by a neighbor with two prior convictions for sex offenses.7   
Concerned that too many sex offenders were falling through the cracks 
when they crossed state lines, Congress ultimately passed the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the AWA) to create “a comprehensive 
national system for the registration of [sex] offenders”8  The AWA, like its 
predecessors, was named for a child victim of a violent crime—Adam Walsh, 
a six-year-old boy abducted and murdered in 1981.9  This law was enacted with 
 
2. In 2016, a long-time suspect in Jacob’s disappearance confessed to murdering Jacob and led 
the police to Jacob’s grave as part of a plea deal for unrelated child pornography charges.  See, e.g., 
Louwagie & Brooks, supra note 1. 
3. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000), 
repealed by Pub. L. No. 109–248, Title I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (July 27, 2006)); see also Wayne A. 
Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5–6 (2008). 
4. 42 U.S.C.  § 14071 (repealed July 27, 2006). 
5. Id. 
6. Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of “New-Generation” SORN Laws, 21 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 426, 434 (2018).  This law also threatened states with a loss of 10% of federal funding 
for noncompliance.  Id. 
7. See Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and 
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 92 (1996); see also John G. Malcolm, The 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: A Sensible and Workable Law that Helps Keep Us 
Safe, 13 ENGAGE 53, 53 (2012) (noting that the fact that Megan’s neighbor had prior convictions for 
sex offenses “was known to law enforcement but not by the community”). 
8. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017). 
9. See Malcolm, supra note 7, at 53.  Adam’s father, John, later became famous for hosting the 
television series America’s Most Wanted.  See Olivia B. Waxman, The U.S. Is Still Dealing with the 
Murder of Adam Walsh, TIME (Aug. 10, 2016), https://time.com/4437205/adam-walsh-murder/ 
[https://perma.cc/2PNZ-W5AR]. 
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the express purpose of “protect[ing] the public from sex offenders and offenders 
against children.”10   
To help effectuate the AWA’s purposes, Congress passed the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as Title I of the Adam Walsh Act,11 
which created requirements for sex offenders to register where they live, work, 
and go to school.12  Furthermore, it created a mechanism to enforce SORNA’s 
registration requirements—18 U.S.C. § 2250—which makes it a crime 
punishable up to ten years imprisonment for any “sex offender” to “travel[] in 
interstate or foreign commerce” but “knowingly fail[] to register or update” his 
SORNA registration.13 
When determining whether a criminal defendant’s prior state conviction 
constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA, thus requiring registration, courts 
look to the elements of the prior crime and compare them to the elements of 
generic crimes covered by the federal statute.14  Under this “categorical” 
approach, if the statute of conviction shares the same elements or defines the 
crime more narrowly than the generic federal statute, there exists a categorical 
match between the two.15  The underlying offense then constitutes a sex offense 
and triggers the SORNA registration requirements (as well as the penalties that 
follow should the defendant have failed to satisfy those requirements).16  But if 
the statute of conviction covered is broader than its generic counterpart, then it 
will not serve as a SORNA predicate.17  The categorical approach is not only 
applied to determine whether the underlying offense constituted a sex offense 
under SORNA but also, if it did, how long the defendant is required to register 
under SORNA and what the defendant’s base offense level for sentencing 
purposes is.18   
 
10. 34 U.S.C. § 20901. 
11. Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, 20 UPDATE 1, 1 (2007); see 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (July 27, 2006) 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 16901). 
12. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a). 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016). 
14. Bonnie Kane, SORNA: A Primer, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 43, 44 (2011). 
15. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575, 600 (1990). 
16. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
17. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260–61. 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 2018 WL 3325909, *6, *9 (E.D. Wis. 2018). 
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A key rule for sentencing courts applying the categorical approach is that 
they may only look to the elements of the prior conviction to determine if it 
constitutes a SORNA predicate; the categorical approach precludes any inquiry 
into the facts underlying the prior conviction.19   
Despite this restriction, several U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that, when 
sentencing a defendant for failing to comply with SORNA, sentencing courts 
may sometimes employ a “circumstance-specific approach,” which permits 
them to look beyond the prior offense’s elements to the facts underlying that 
offense.20  However, as the Supreme Court has cautioned, allowing sentencing 
courts to make “findings of fact that properly belong to juries” poses “practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness” as well as Sixth Amendment concerns.21 
The Supreme Court has developed the rules governing the categorical 
approach and its alternatives, but it has not yet applied any of these approaches 
in a SORNA case.22  However, the Court’s precedent indicates that a court 
should apply three factors to determine if it must apply a strict categorical 
approach or is free to pursue a circumstance-specific inquiry when sentencing 
a sex offender for violating SORNA.23  First, courts should examine the 
statutory text and legislative history of SORNA to determine whether Congress 
intended for courts to stick to a strict element-to-element analysis (i.e., the 
categorical approach) or whether it intended for courts to consider the 
defendant’s actual conduct underlying any prior convictions.24  Second, courts 
should take into account the practical difficulties with a circumstance-specific 
approach.25  Finally, courts should determine whether the Sixth Amendment is 
implicated by the proceeding,26 which would prevent courts from considering 
 
19. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261. 
20. See generally United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that courts 
may conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine whether the defendant’s conduct met a sentencing 
enhancement exception); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
courts may look at the facts underlying the prior conviction “for the limited purpose of determining the 
victim’s age”); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that courts may 
examine the “underlying facts of a defendant’s offense, to determine whether a defendant has 
committed a ‘specified offense against a minor’”); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 
993–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that SORNA’s legislative history permits courts to consider the age of 
the victim, even if that is not an element of the underlying offense). 
21. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267. 
22. See infra Part III.  At the same time, these approaches have been applied by several U.S. 
Courts of Appeals in SORNA cases in the years since Congress enacted SORNA.  See infra Part IV. 
23. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990). 
24. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01. 
25. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267. 
26. Id. 
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any facts other than that of a prior conviction or those admitted by the defendant 
to increase the maximum statutory penalty the defendant faces.27 
After reviewing these three factors, this Comment will argue that Congress 
in some instances intended for courts to consider the facts underlying a sex 
offender’s prior conviction when sentencing them for violating SORNA’s 
requirements.28  However, this Comment also argues that Sixth Amendment 
concerns and practical considerations suggest that sentencing courts should 
only be able to consult a limited class of documents, such as a plea deal or plea 
colloquy, under this analysis.29  And, furthermore, the only facts that the court 
will be able to use from those documents must be those admitted by the 
defendant.30 
Part II of this Comment provides additional background information on 
SORNA, including the three different “tiers” used to classify sex offenders and 
the sentencing consequences faced by tier I, II, and III offenders.31  Part III 
discusses (1) the categorical approach and its two alternatives; (2) the modified 
categorical approach and the circumstance-specific approach; and (3) the rules 
governing the application of each approach.32  Part IV surveys the decisions by 
several U.S. Courts of Appeals to permit the use of the circumstance-specific 
approach to discover certain facts for the purposes of tier classification and 
sentencing of sex offenders under SORNA.33  Finally, Part V analyzes 
SORNA’s text and legislative history, the practical concerns with employing a 
circumstance-specific in this context, and whether the Sixth Amendment is 
implicated in SORNA prosecutions.34   
This Comment suggests that none of the three current approaches for 
statutory comparison effectively reconcile Congress’s intent that the law “cast 
a wide net to ensnare as many offenders against children as possible”35 with the 
Sixth Amendment concerns at issue here.36  As a result, this Comment 
 
27. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
28. See infra Section V.A. 
29. See infra Section V.D. 
30. See infra Section V.D. 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. See infra Part III. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. See infra Part V.  
35. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010). 
36. See infra Section V.C. 
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recommends that a new, unique approach to statutory comparison should be 
applied in this context, which this Comment dubs a “restricted circumstance-
specific approach.”37  Such an approach would permit sentencing courts to 
examine the facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction but only those 
that were admitted by the defendant in certain “Shepard documents” making 
up the formal record of conviction.38 
II.  BACKGROUND OF SORNA 
SORNA serves to assist federal and local authorities in “monitoring and 
tracking sex offenders following their release into the community.”39  To do so, 
it requires sex offenders to provide personal information to the authorities 
regarding their identification and where they can be found at all times.  The law 
requires the following information to be included in the registry: the sex 
offender’s name; their Social Security number; their home address; the name 
and address of their workplace; the name and address of where they will be a 
student; their license plate number and a description of any vehicle they owns 
or operates; information about any planned trips abroad; and “[a]ny other 
information required by the Attorney General.”40   
On top of all that, the following additional information on a sex offender 
must be included in the registry: their physical description; “[t]he text of the 
provision of law defining the criminal offense for which the sex offender is 
registered”; their criminal history; a current photograph of the sex offender; a 
set of their fingerprints and palm prints; a DNA sample; a copy of their driver 
license or ID card; and, again, “[a]ny other information required by the 
Attorney General.”41  A sex offender’s failure to register or update his 
registration when traveling across state lines or abroad is a federal crime, 
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.42   
 
37. See infra Section V.D. 
38. See infra Section V.D.  These documents are referred to as “Shepard documents” after 
Shepard v. United States, and they are a purposely limited class of documents that includes “the 
statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any 
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009). 
39. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-act-sorna 
[https://perma.cc/S8CG-J3UF]. 
40. 34 U.S.C. § 20914(a)(1)–(8) (2017). 
41. Id. § 20914(b)(1)–(8). 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)–(b) (2016).  But the law does provide an affirmative defense for a sex 
offender, provided that all the following circumstances are met: the offender was prevented from 
complying with the registration requirements due to an “uncontrollable circumstance[]”; that 
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SORNA places sex offenders into three tiers,43 and each offender’s specific 
tier designation is determined based on “the seriousness of their underlying sex 
offense.”44  When a sex offender is being prosecuted in federal court for failing 
to register under SORNA, the court determines both how long that defendant 
was required to register and the base level of the defendant’s sentencing range 
by looking at the defendant’s tier classification.45  Each tier classification 
carries with it a progressively longer registration period—tier I offenders must 
keep their registrations current for fifteen years, tier II offenders for twenty-five 
years, and tier III offenders for life.46   
The tier classifications also correlate to “base offense levels” for sentencing 
purposes.47  A tier I sex offender has a base offense level of 12 when convicted 
under § 2250(a).48  A tier II offender has a base offense level of 14,49 and tier 
III offender has a base offense level of 16.50  A sex offender’s offense level, 
along with other sentencing factors, helps determine how much prison time he 
faces upon conviction.51  When only looking to the base offense levels that 
correspond to each tier—without considering any other factors that might 
increase or decrease the offender’s ultimate criminal sentence—a tier I sex 
offender faces a maximum of sixteen months’ imprisonment, a tier II sex 
offender faces a maximum of twenty-one months, and a tier III sex offender 
faces a maximum of twenty-seven months.52 
A tier III offender is one “whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for 
more than 1 year and . . . is comparable to or more severe than . . . aggravated 
sexual abuse or sexual abuse . . . or abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor 
who has not attained the age of 13 years . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to 
 
circumstance was not created by the offender “in reckless disregard of the intent to comply”; and the 
offender “complied as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.”  Id. § 2250(c). 
43. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2)–(4) (2017). 
44. United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1129 (10th Cir. 2015). 
45. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016). 
46. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(1)–(3). 
47. See U.S.S.G § 2A3.5(a)(1)–(3). 
48. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(3). 
49. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(2). 
50. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(1). 
51. See id. § 2A3.5. 
52. See id. § 2A3.5.  Of course, the offender’s sentence can be adjusted based on other factors, 
but these are the consequences sex offenders face at their base offense level for each tier.  18 
U.S.C. § 2250 (2016).  And, again, a sex offender can be imprisoned for up to ten years for a violation 
of § 2250(a).  Id. § 2250(a).  
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commit such an offense.”53  The listed offenses—aggravated sexual abuse, 
sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact against a minor under the age of 
thirteen—are all described in separate statutory sections, which can be 
consulted to determine if the underlying offense of conviction is indeed 
“comparable to or more severe than” any of them.54  Also included under the 
tier III classification are those whose underlying offenses “involve[d] 
kidnapping of a minor,” so long as the offender was not the minor’s parent or 
guardian, or those whose offense “occur[ed] after the offender [became] a tier 
II sex offender.”55  Ostensibly, Congress sought to keep individuals convicted 
of tier III offenses on a significantly shorter leash than tier I or II offenders, 
generally requiring them to keep their SORNA registrations current for the 
remainder of their lives once they are released into the community.56 
A sex offender is a tier II offender if his underlying offense is punishable 
by imprisonment for greater than a year and falls into one of three categories.57  
The first category is for those whose underlying offense is comparable to or 
more severe than several listed offenses committed against a minor, which 
include “sex trafficking,” “coercion and enticement,” “transportation with 
intent to engage in criminal sexual activity,” and “abusive sexual contact.”58  
The second category covers underlying offenses that involve “use of a minor in 
a sexual performance,” “solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution,” or 
“production or distribution of child pornography.”59  The third category of tier 
II offenders covers those whose offense “occurs after the offender has become 
a tier I sex offender.”60   
As can be noted based on the above information, an underlying offense that 
is comparable to or more severe than “abusive sexual contact” as defined by 18 
U.S.C. § 2244 can lead to a sex offender being designated either a tier III 
offender or a tier II offender.61  The key distinguishing factor between the 
“abusive sexual contact” that renders a sex offender a tier III offender versus a 
 
53. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A) (2017). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. § 20911(4)(B)–(C).  
56. See id. § 20915(a)(3). 
57. Id. § 20911(3). 
58. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(i)–(iv). 
59. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(i)–(iii). 
60. Id. § 20911(3)(C). 
61. See id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier II 
offenders); § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier III offenders). 
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tier II offender is the age of the victim of the underlying offense.62  For one to 
be a tier III offender because his underlying sex offense constituted abusive 
sexual contact, the victim must have been under the age of thirteen.63  The 
victim need only be a minor for the offender to be designated a tier II offender.64  
According to the statute, a “minor” is an “an individual who has not attained 
the age of 18 years.”65  Thus, with regard to an offense that is comparable to or 
more severe than abusive sexual contact as described in § 2244, the offender 
will be a tier II offender if the victim was between the ages of thirteen and 
seventeen and a tier III offender if the victim was under the age of thirteen. 
A tier I sex offender is defined concisely by the statute as “a sex offender 
other than a tier II or tier III sex offender.”66  Additionally, the statute defines 
“sex offender” equally as concisely, stating that a sex offender is “an individual 
who was convicted of a sex offense.”67  By “sex offense,” the statute is referring 
to criminal offenses that have “an element involving a sexual act or sexual 
contact with another,” those that are “specified offense[s] against a minor,”68 
certain types of federal offenses, certain types of military offenses, or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above.69  Criminal offenses covered 
by this statute include any “[s]tate, local, tribal, foreign, or military 
offense . . . or other criminal offense.”70   
 
62. See id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier II 
offenders); § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier III offenders). 
63. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii). 
64. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv). 
65. Id. § 20911(14). 
66. Id. § 20911(2). 
67. Id. § 20911(1). 
68. Id. § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(ii).  Specified offenses against a minor include any that are committed 
against a minor and involve kidnapping, false imprisonment, “[s]olicitation to engage in sexual 
conduct . . .  [or] to practice prostitution,” “[u]se in a sexual performance,” “[v]ideo voyeurism,” 
possession of child pornography, production of child pornography, distribution of child pornography, 
“[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor,” “the use of the internet to facilitate or attempt” sexual 
conduct involving a minor, or “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”  
Id. § 20911(7)(A)–(I). 
69. Id. § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(v).  The Federal offenses described that may constitute sex offenses 
under this statute include certain types of offenses committed within Indian country as well as 
“[d]omestic assault by an habitual offender” committed “within the special maritime or territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2014).  The military 
offenses included under this statute are those specified in Pub. L. No. 105–119, § 115(a)(8)(C)(i), 111 
Stat. 2440 (1997). 
70. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(6). 
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III.  THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH VS. ITS ALTERNATIVES 
In comparing a state statute of conviction to a generic federal statute, courts 
will take one of three general approaches.  The first approach is the narrowest 
and is variously referred to as the “formal categorical approach,” the “elements-
centric” approach, or simply the categorical approach.71  This approach calls 
for an element-to-element comparison between the two statutes to determine if 
there is a “categorical match” between the two statutes.72  The second approach 
is known as the “modified categorical approach.”73  Under this approach, courts 
must still look to the elements of both statutes (federal and state), but they may 
also consult a limited class of “extra-statutory materials” from the state-level 
proceedings.74  The third approach is known as the “circumstance-specific” 
approach.75  A court using this approach may look beyond both the bare 
elements of the state statute and the limited class of documents it would be 
permitted to review under the modified approach and examine “the facts and 
circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction.”76  In other words, when 
applying the broader circumstance-specific approach, courts are less 
constrained by what they may review when comparing a state statute to a 
generic federal statute.   
The Supreme Court has developed the rules governing the application of 
the categorical approach, often in cases involving the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (ACCA)77 but also with cases regarding the Gun Control Act of 196878 and 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).79  A key distinction to be made at 
the outset is the difference between elements and facts: 
“Elements” are the “constituent parts” of a crime’s legal 
 
71. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261, 267 (2013). 
72. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013). 
73. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 260–63. 
74. Id. at 263. 
75. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009). 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247–48 (2016); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 
254, 277–78; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
600–01 (1990). 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009). 
79. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 29, 43.  All of these contexts—ACCA, the Gun Control Act 
of 1968, and INA—resemble SORNA cases in that they involve comparing a defendant’s prior state 
offense of conviction to a generic federal offense listed in the relevant statutory scheme to determine 
if there exists a categorical match. See infra Section III.A.  And ACCA in particular resembles SORNA 
because both schemes involve imposing federal sentence enhancements based on prior state offenses.  
See infra Section III.A.  Therefore, ACCA cases provide a useful context for analyzing issues relating 
to statutory comparison in SORNA cases.  See infra Part V. 
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definition—the things that the “prosecution must prove to 
sustain a conviction.”  At a trial, they are what the jury must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant, and 
at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant necessarily 
admits when he pleads guilty.  Facts, by contrast, are mere real 
world things—extraneous to the crime’s legal 
requirements. . . .  They are “circumstances[s]” or “event[s]” 
having no “legal effect [or] consequence”: In particular, they 
need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant.80 
This distinction—elements vs. facts—is important because it forms the line 
of what things a court may look at when comparing statutes under different 
approaches.  The narrower the approach employed, the less the court may 
review when deciding if a defendant’s prior offense categorically matches the 
generic federal counterpart. 
A.  The Categorical Approach 
The categorical approach has been most commonly used in the context of 
ACCA, which operates to enhance the sentences of certain criminal defendants 
in federal court based on their past state offenses.81  Similar to how SORNA 
operates with regard to sex offenders and certain state-level sex offenses, 
ACCA only applies when the defendant’s underlying state offenses are of a 
certain type.82  For example, ACCA operates to punish certain federal 
defendants being convicted in federal court on gun charges when they have 
three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”83  And 
like SORNA, ACCA then provides specific definitions for “violent felony” and 
“serious drug offense.”84 
When comparing a generic federal statute to an underlying state statute of 
conviction, the categorical approach requires courts to look only to the elements 
of the defendant’s prior offense.85  Then the court endeavors to compare those 
state elements to the elements of the generic federal offense.86  If the two 
 
80. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (citations omitted). 
81. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.   
82. See id.; see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577–78. 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
84. Id. § 924(e)(2), amended by First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 401(a)(1), 132 
Stat. 5220 (2018). 
85. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 261. 
86. Id. at 257; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CATEGORICAL APPROACH PRIMER 1, 5–6 
(2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2017_Categorical_Approach.pdf 
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statutes have identical elements, then there is a categorical match between 
them.87  If the defendant is a sex offender in federal court due to a SORNA 
violation, the prior offense will then serve as a SORNA predicate.88  
Additionally, the same result will follow if the state statute defines the crime of 
conviction more narrowly than its federal counterpart because anyone 
convicted under that state law will be “guilty of all the [federal offense’s] 
elements.”89 
The elements remain the focus of this inquiry.  Courts applying the 
categorical approach will not be permitted to examine any of the underlying 
facts of conviction.90  Therefore, if the state statute of conviction is broader in 
scope than its generic federal counterpart, there will be no categorical match 
and the underlying state offense will not constitute a SORNA predicate.91  
Without question, there may be instances where the defendant actually 
committed the generic federal offense and was convicted of doing so at the state 
level, but because the state statute is broader than its federal counterpart, a court 
employing a strict categorical approach will nevertheless conclude that there is 
not a categorical match between the two statutes.92  A strict categorical 
approach, therefore, is a purposefully limited inquiry. 
When writing in the context of ACCA, the Supreme Court has provided 
three reasons in support of the use of a strict categorical approach.93  The first 
reason offered was premised on ACCA’s text and legislative history.94  The 
Court found that the text “generally supports the inference that Congress 
intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had 
been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts 
underlying the prior convictions.”95  Further, the statute’s legislative history 
 
[https://perma.cc/5CDT-DN5E] (explaining that the categorical approach involves four steps: first, the 
court must “identify the [statutory] definition at issue;” second, the court must “determine the statute 
of conviction;” third, the court “list[s] the elements of the statute of conviction;” and finally, the court 
“[c]ompare[s] the elements in the statute of conviction to those in the definition”). 
87. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. 
88. A predicate offense is “[a]n earlier offense that can be used to enhance a sentence levied for 
a later conviction.”  Predicate Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  The earlier 
offense in SORNA cases is thus the state sex offense conviction. 
89. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261. 
90. Id.  
91. United States v. Walker, 2018 WL 3325909, *6–7 (E.D. Wis. 2018). 
92. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 
93. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990). 
94. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01. 
95. Id. at 600.  
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“show[ed] that Congress generally took a categorical approach to predicate 
offenses.”96 
Another rationale that the Court articulated for the categorical approach is 
that “the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are 
daunting.”97  As explained by the Court, 
In case after case, sentencing courts following [a factual 
approach] would have to expend resources examining (often 
aged) documents for evidence that a defendant admitted in a 
plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial, facts that, 
although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an 
element of the relevant generic offense.  The meaning of those 
documents will often be uncertain.  And the statements of fact 
in them may be downright wrong.  A defendant, after all, often 
has little incentive to contest facts that are not elements of the 
charged offense—and may have good reason not to.  At trial, 
extraneous facts and arguments may confuse the jury.  (Indeed, 
the court may prohibit them for that reason.)  And during plea 
hearings, the defendant may not wish to irk the prosecutor or 
court by squabbling over superfluous factual allegations.98 
What’s more, federal courts are already overburdened, and requiring them 
to engage in factual inquiries for the purposes of statutory comparison would 
only serve to further pile on to their caseloads.99   
Finally, employing anything other than a strict categorical approach could 
raise Sixth Amendment concerns.100  Chiefly, the issue would be whether an 
alternative approach allows a court to abridge the defendant’s right to a jury 
trial by allowing the court to engage in fact-finding inquiries that are squarely 
the province of the jury.101  The Supreme Court has held that “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt”102 or otherwise must be admitted by the 
 
96. Id. at 601 (“If Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would require the sentencing 
court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant’s prior offenses, surely this 
would have been mentioned somewhere in the legislative history.”). 
97. Id. 
98. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 270. 
99. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
100. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 269 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
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defendant.103  Therefore, by looking beyond the bare elements of a defendant’s 
prior conviction and examining the facts underlying it when sentencing a 
defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, a court may be butting up against the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment.  
B.  The Modified Categorical Approach 
The modified categorical approach is a slight variation of the strict 
categorical approach.  This approach should only be employed by a court when 
the underlying statute of conviction is divisible,104 or lists one or more of its 
elements in the alternative (i.e., “comprises multiple, alternative versions of the 
crime”).105  When a court needs to compare a defendant’s divisible statute of 
conviction to a generic federal offense for sentencing purposes, that court will 
be entitled to employ the modified categorical approach to do so.106  Such an 
approach would permit that court to review a limited set of materials to help it 
determine which alternative element “formed the basis of the defendant’s 
conviction.”107  The documents that the court may consult in these 
circumstances include so-called “Shepard documents”108—”the statutory 
definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”109  Without the benefit of consulting these “extra-statutory 
documents,” the court may be unable to determine whether the statute of 
conviction and the federal statute are a categorical match.110  But again, this 
 
103. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
104. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258, 278.  A divisible statute can be defined as one “in which 
multiple types of conduct are criminal, but only some qualify for a sentence enhancement . . . [or] ‘a 
statute that sets out different offenses within one statute.’”  Stephanie Marie Toribio, Note, Effective 
Criminal Sentencing?: Analyzing the Effectiveness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Career 
Offenders, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 377, 394 (2016) (quoting U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
2016 ANNUAL NATIONAL SEMINAR: CATEGORICAL APPROACH (2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-
seminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T3P-WQWF]).  
105. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 262. 
106. Id. at 278. 
107. Id. at 257, 263. 
108.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at 4. 
109. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).  Again, these documents are referred to 
as “Shepard documents” after Shepard v. United States, where the Supreme Court limited sentencing 
courts’ examinations of divisible statutes to this limited class of documents in ACCA.  Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
602 (1990)). 
110. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. 
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approach may only be employed by courts in that “narrow range of cases” when 
courts are comparing statutes and confronted with a divisible statute.111 
To further illustrate that this approach should only be applied in rare 
situations, the Supreme Court emphasized that the modified categorical is a 
“tool for implementing the categorical approach,” rather than an exception to 
that approach.112  The modified categorical approach simply allows the court to 
determine which elements in a divisible statute formed the basis of the 
defendant’s prior conviction.113  If it can identify those elements based on 
documents such as the indictment or the jury instructions, then from there 
onward the court employs a strict categorical approach, comparing those 
elements to the elements of the generic federal statute.114  Once the court 
identifies which of the alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s 
conviction, it cannot consult any extra-statutory materials moving forward; it 
must stick to the elemental approach.115  Any other factual inquiries would be 
impermissible under the modified categorical approach.116 
C.  The Circumstance-Specific Approach 
The circumstance-specific (or non-categorical) approach permits a court to 
“look to the facts and circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction” in 
those situations where the statutory provision at issue “refer[s] to the specific 
way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion.”117  In 
order to determine whether it may apply the circumstance-specific approach, a 
court should determine if the provision contains “qualifying language” that 
refers to the conduct or circumstances surrounding the commission of a specific 
offense.118  In other words, the key question is whether the provision contained 
language that invokes the specific facts underlying the prior offense, as opposed 
to the bare elements of the offense.  For example, in Nijhawan v. Holder, an 
immigration case in which the Supreme Court approved the use of 
circumstance-specific approach, the Court reasoned that the statutory language 
at issue was “consistent with a circumstance-specific approach” because the 
 
111. Id. at 261; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
112. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 262–63. 
113. Id. at 257. 
114. Id. at 262. 
115. Id. at 263–64. 
116. Id. 
117. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009). 
118. Id. at 38–40. 
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relevant language (the phrase “in which”) “refer[red] to the conduct involved 
‘in’ the commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of 
the offense.”119 
Should a court decide that the statutory language at issue calls for a non-
categorical interpretation, that court will then be able to look beyond the prior 
offense’s bare elements and instead examine the facts underlying the offense to 
determine if it constitutes a sex offense for the purposes of SORNA.120  An 
important question to consider here is what, exactly, the court could consult to 
find these facts, i.e., what types of sentencing-related documents.  This 
determination might be impacted by whether the court is confronted with a 
criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding, which involve different evidentiary 
burdens.  Nijhawan involved a civil deportation proceeding, rather than a 
criminal proceeding, an important distinction noted by the Court.121  Because 
of the different burdens that must be met by the government in each proceeding 
(“clear and convincing” vs. “beyond a reasonable doubt”), the Court reasoned 
that a court in a civil proceeding would not be limited to the same class of 
documents as it would when employing a modified categorical approach in a 
criminal proceeding—i.e., the charging document, plea colloquy, plea 
agreement, jury instructions, or a comparable judicial record.122  Rather, an 
immigration judge could rely upon “earlier sentencing-related material” as long 
as the underlying fact could be shown by clear and convincing evidence.123  
Other federal immigration cases that followed Nijhawan have expounded upon 
what exactly constitutes this “earlier sentencing-related material,” finding that 
documents such as affidavits of probable cause, police reports, criminal 
complaints, or pre-sentencing reports fit the bill.124 
However, if a court applies the circumstance-specific approach in the 
SORNA context, the reasoning in Nijhawan suggests that the court’s factual 
inquiry should be limited to the Shepard documents making up the record of 
 
119. Id. at 38–39 (emphasis in original). 
120. Kane, supra note 14, at 44. 
121. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. 
122. See id. at 35, 41. 
123. Id. at 42–43. 
124. See Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2010); Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 
749, 753–54 (BIA 2016), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Thomas, 27 I&N Dec. 674, 2019 
WL 5546810 (U.S. Atty. Gen. Oct. 25, 2019); Michael R. Devitt, Improper Deportation of Legal 
Permanent Residents: The U.S. Government’s Mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Nijhawan v. Holder, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 34–36 (2013); Kelly Morgan, Comment, 
Circumstances Requiring Safeguards: Limitations on the Application of the Categorical Approach in 
Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 243, 262 (2017). 
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conviction.125  This “evidentiary list” was developed in Shepard and other 
ACCA cases for the purpose of “determining which statutory phrase (contained 
within a statutory provision that covers several different generic crimes) 
covered a prior conviction.”126  This is the very same sort of statutory 
comparison that a court undertakes in SORNA cases.127  As a result, even if a 
SORNA case arises where a court may be permitted to employ the 
circumstance-specific approach to assess the defendant’s conduct, that court 
should limit its analysis to any Shepard documents available. 
IV.  THE CONSENSUS DEVELOPING AT THE CIRCUIT LEVEL 
While the Supreme Court has provided the general rules governing the use 
of the categorical approach and its alternatives, it has not yet spoken on the 
application of these approaches in the context of SORNA.  However, several 
U.S. Courts of Appeals have directly addressed the applicability of the 
categorical approach in SORNA cases and carved out several scenarios where 
courts may depart from the strict categorical approach and apply the 
circumstance-specific approach. 
Several Courts of Appeals have concluded that a court can examine the 
facts underlying a prior conviction for determining the age of the victim of that 
prior offense when prosecuting a sex offender for a SORNA violation.128  Of 
these, the Tenth Circuit has held that the use of the circumstance-specific 
approach should be restricted to only determining this one fact, “a single fact 
that is easy to prove and, in an ordinary case, not easily disputed.”129  But the 
reasoning in several other U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions does not suggest 
such limitations.  Rather, these decisions have noted that SORNA often speaks 
in fact-specific language or uses fact-based qualifiers that refer to how an 
offense was committed, and because this textual language clearly speaks to 
conduct as opposed to the elements of a prior conviction, its use should signal 
 
125. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41. 
126. Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). 
127. United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016)) 
(noting that in sentencing a defendant for violating SORNA, the sentencing judge will “determine the 
defendant’s tier classification . . . by examining the elements of the statute under which the defendant 
was convicted.”). 
128. See infra Section III.A. 
129. United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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that Congress is calling for the use of a circumstance-specific approach in 
analyzing it.130 
A.  Limiting the Reach of the Circumstance-Specific Approach in SORNA 
Cases: The Tenth Circuit in United States v. White 
The age of the victim of a sex offender’s underlying offenses in SORNA 
cases can be important to determine (a) whether the victim was a minor and (b) 
whether the defendant qualifies as tier II or a tier III sex offender.  Recall, 
SORNA characterizes a “minor” as “an individual who has not attained the age 
of 18 years.”131  Further, a sex offender will be classified as a tier II offender if 
he commits one of several offenses listed in the statute “against a minor” (i.e., 
against someone less than eighteen years of age)132 or if his crime involved 
either the “use of a minor in a sexual performance”133 or the “solicitation of a 
minor to practice prostitution.”134  Therefore, whether a sex offender is either a 
tier I or tier II sex offender in many instances may depend on the age of the 
victim—i.e., whether the victim was less than eighteen years of age.  
Additionally, the age of the victim can be important in determining whether 
a sex offender is a tier III offender as well.  If the underlying sex offense 
involved “abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the 
age of 13 years,” the sex offender should then be properly classified as a tier III 
offender.135  “[A]busive sexual contact” can also constitute a tier II offense,136 
but the victim need only be a minor,137 not a minor under thirteen years old.  
Therefore, one will be a tier II offender if he commits abusive sexual contact 
against a victim who is at least thirteen years old and under eighteen years, but 
the sex offender will be a tier III offender if the victim is under the age of 
thirteen.  Because a sex offender will face different registration requirements as 
well as different sentencing consequences for failure to register based on his 
 
130. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777 
F.3d 700, 708–09 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1233 (7th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 
1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010). 
131. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(14) (2017). 
132. See id. § 20911(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
133. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
134. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
135. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
136. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv). 
137. Id. § 20911(3)(A). 
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tier classification,138 whether a court can look at a fact such as the victim’s age 
for slotting the offender into a specific tier can have real consequences.  
Although several U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that the age of the 
victim is just the sort of fact that a court may use the circumstance-specific 
approach to examine,139 the Tenth Circuit expressly limited the circumstance-
specific inquiry solely to the age of the victim in United States v. White.140  In 
White, when sentencing a defendant for failing to comply with SORNA’s 
requirements, the court examined the record of the underlying state conviction 
to determine the age of the victim and the nature of the offense and concluded 
on these facts that the defendant was a tier III sex offender because his offense 
involved “abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the 
age of 13 years.”141  The court noted the importance of properly determining a 
defendant’s tier classification, as that dictates the defendant’s offense level and 
likely the ultimate length of the sentence as well.142 
The Tenth Circuit noted that SORNA’s statutory language at issue in this 
case, which spoke of “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of 
title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years,”143 referenced 
a statutory section (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2244) that does not include the age of the 
victim as an element of the offense.144  Therefore, the court reasoned that it must 
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine if the victim was less 
than thirteen years of age.145  Otherwise, because the victim’s age was not an 
element of the underlying offense, “a comparison based on the categorical 
approach will never reveal the age of the victim and therefore [the underlying 
offense will] never constitute a tier III offense.”146   
At the same time, however, the Tenth Circuit held that the circumstance-
specific approach should be limited to determining the age of the victim in 
SORNA cases, at least in those provisions where “SORNA cross-references a 
 
138. See supra Part I. 
139. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. White, 782 
F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 993–94 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
140. See White, 782 F.3d at 1135. 
141. Id. at 1132 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii)). 
142. Id. at 1129. 
143. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii). 
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specific section of the criminal code.”147  The court stated that the factual 
inquiry should be limited in this manner due to “equitable and practical 
concerns” with the circumstance-specific approach.148  The court reasoned that 
employing the circumstance-specific approach to simply determine the victim’s 
age will avoid these issues because age “is a single fact that is easy to prove 
and, in an ordinary case, not easily disputed.”149 
B.  A Broader Interpretation—Using the Circumstance-Specific Approach in 
SORNA Cases Whenever the Text Speaks in “Fact-Specific” Language 
While the Tenth Circuit in White held that the use of the circumstance-
specific approach should be limited to determining a victim’s age, other U.S. 
Courts of Appeals have reasoned that the circumstance-specific approach 
should be employed in SORNA cases whenever the statutory text uses fact-
specific language that speaks to the defendant’s conduct rather than the 
elements of any underlying conviction.150  These courts have employed this 
reasoning to justify the use of the circumstance-specific approach not only to 
determine a victim’s age but also to determine whether an underlying offense 
of conviction constituted a “specified offense against a minor“151 or whether 
any of SORNA’s statutory exceptions applied to a defendant’s underlying 
offense.152   
SORNA defines what constitutes a specified offense against a minor by 
listing several offenses for comparison,153 but the last listed is “[a]ny conduct 
that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor,”154 a catch-all category.155  
And among its statutory exceptions, SORNA provides two such exceptions for 
 
147. Id. at 1135. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777 
F.3d 700, 708–09 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 
1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 992–94 (9th Cir. 2008). 
151. See Price, 777 F.3d at 708; Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355–56; Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d at 992–
94; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON SEX OFFENSES: SEXUAL ABUSE AND FAILURE TO 
REGISTER OFFENSES 1, 9 (2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Sex_Offense_Register.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7NV-BZGS]. 
152. See Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1236. 
153. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7) (2017). 
154. Id. § 20911(7)(I). 
155. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d at 988. 
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“[o]ffenses involving consensual sexual conduct.”156  The first applies if the 
victim was an adult and was not “under the custodial authority of the offender 
at the time of the offense.”157  The second applies “if the victim was at least 13 
years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.”158  
If an offense satisfies either exception, then it will not be a sex offense under 
SORNA.159 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals surveyed here all base their reasoning on the 
Supreme Court’s instruction in Nijhawan v. Holder.  Nijhawan specifies that 
when the statutory language at issue “refer[s] to the conduct involved ‘in’ the 
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the 
offense,” it calls for a circumstance-specific analysis.160  They mainly agree that 
the categorical approach applies to the “threshold definition of sex offense,”161 
whenever the federal statute that is being compared to the underlying conviction 
refers to a generic offense,162 or when the federal statute “speaks in categorical 
or elements-based terms rather than ‘circumstance-specific’ terms.”163  But at 
the same time, whenever Congress uses more fact-centric language in 
SORNA’s text, these courts are likely to conclude that Congress is suggesting 
that courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach.164  The following 
cases illustrate this broader interpretation by other U.S. Courts of Appeals 
outside the Tenth Circuit. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Mi Kyung Byun 
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Mi Kyung Byun that courts may 
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine the victim’s age when 
evaluating whether a defendant committed a specified offense against a 
minor.165  Byun involved a defendant who imported a seventeen-year-old 
 
156. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id.   
160. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
161. United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015). 
162. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 192 (2013); Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34–35; United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 
704–05 (4th Cir. 2015). 
163. Rogers, 804 F. 3d at 1236 (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36). 
164. See, e.g., id. at 1236–37. 
165. United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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woman into the country to work in the defendant’s club, where the seventeen-
year-old was expected to engage in prostitution with some of the club’s 
customers.166  Although the defendant pled guilty to three alien smuggling 
offenses, she did not plead guilty to the charge of transporting a minor for 
purposes of prostitution.167  However, she did admit in her plea agreement that 
she induced the seventeen-year-old woman to come to Guam to engage in 
prostitution and that the defendant knew at the time that this woman was 
seventeen years old.168   
The Ninth Circuit cited the defendant’s admissions in concluding that the 
defendant committed a specified offense against a minor, reasoning that it was 
permitted to do so because SORNA’s language,169 structure, and legislative 
history170 allow courts to consider the underlying facts of the defendant’s 
offense to determine the age of the victim.171  Therefore, the court held that the 
defendant was required to register under SORNA: her plea agreement showed 
that she imported a seventeen-year-old alien into Guam to engage in 
prostitution, and these underlying facts were sufficient to allow the court to 
conclude the defendant committed a specified offense against a minor.172 
2.  The Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Dodge 
The Eleventh Circuit went even further in examining a defendant’s 
underlying conduct to determine that he committed a specified offense against 
a minor.  In United States v. Dodge, the defendant, a thirty-three-year-old man, 
pled guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor for emailing indecent 
pictures of himself to a person who he thought to be a thirteen-year-old girl.173  
While the Ninth Circuit in Byun limited its circumstance-specific inquiry to the 
age of the victim, the Eleventh Circuit in Dodge asserted that Byun’s reasoning 
suggested that courts may look beyond the mere elements of the prior offense 
to the facts underlying the conviction to determine if a defendant committed a 
 
166. Id. at 983. 
167. Id. at 983–84. 
168. Id. at 984. 
169. Id. at 993 (reasoning that SORNA’s language “evidences Congress’s intent to require all 
those who commit sex crimes against children to register as sex offenders”). 
170. Id. at 992–93 (finding that SORNA’s legislative history “shows that Congress intended to 
include all individuals who commit sex crimes against minors, not only those who were convicted 
under a statute having the age of the victim as an element . . . [and] reveals substantial discussion of 
the necessity of identifying all child predators”). 
171. Id. at 993–94. 
172. Id. at 994. 
173. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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specified offense against a minor.174  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this 
conclusion was supported by the definition of what constitutes a specified 
offense against a minor (which lacks any mention of elements), the title of the 
statutory section (referring to “offenses” instead of “convictions”), the use of 
general, non-specific language in the statutory section (“include,” “involve[],” 
“by its nature”), and the presence of the broad catch-all provision (“[a]ny 
conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor”) in the list of 
specified offenses against a minor.175   
What’s more, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the statutory language of 
SORNA shows that Congress sought to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many 
offenders against children as possible,” including those whose underlying 
conduct amounted to a sex offense against a minor but ultimate conviction was 
for a lesser-included offense.176  The court concluded that when it comes to 
conduct that lines up with the catch-all provision of what constitutes a specified 
offense against a minor, 
[d]istrict judges do not need a statute to spell out every instance 
of conduct that is a sexual offense against a minor.  They are 
capable of examining the underlying conduct of an offense and 
determining whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that 
“by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”177 
As revealed in the plea colloquy, the defendant’s conduct in Dodge 
involved sending indecent pictures of himself to someone he believed to be a 
minor.178  Although the offense for which Dodge was convicted “did not 
correspond neatly to any listed ‘specified offense against a minor,’” the court 
nevertheless concluded that the defendant’s conduct was “by its nature . . . a 
sex offense against a minor.”179  And because the court concluded that it may 
look past the elements of a prior offense to a defendant’s underlying conduct 
when determining whether the defendant committed a specified offense against 
a minor, the court held that this defendant did indeed commit such an offense 
and was therefore a sex offender required to register under SORNA.180 
 
174. Id. at 1354. 
175. Id. at 1354–55. 
176. Id. at 1355. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1356. 
180. Id. 
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3.  The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Price 
The Fourth Circuit followed Dodge’s lead in also concluding that courts 
may employ a circumstance-specific approach in determining whether a 
defendant committed a specified offense against a minor.  The defendant in 
United States v. Price had a prior conviction “for the common law offense of 
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature,” and he argued that this 
was not a sex offense for the purposes of SORNA.181  However, the plea 
colloquy for the underlying offense revealed that it involved the defendant 
forcing his twelve-year-old stepdaughter to perform a sex act on him.182  The 
court held that the language, structure, and “purpose of SORNA” required it to 
apply a circumstance-specific approach to determine whether the defendant 
committed a specified offense against a minor.183  Therefore, it was permitted 
to review the facts articulated in the plea colloquy to conclude that the 
defendant’s conduct underlying his prior conviction constituted a specified 
offense against a minor.184 
In terms of language and structure, the Fourth Circuit distinguished two 
definitions of what constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA: “a criminal 
offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with 
another,”185 and “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a 
minor.”186  Further, the court pointed to the catch-all provision in the list of 
what constitutes a specified offense against a minor—”[a]ny conduct that by its 
nature is a sex offense against a minor.”187  Unlike the first definition of a sex 
offense provided in the statute, which speaks of a criminal offense with an 
element involving a sexual act or sexual contact, there is no mention of 
“elements” in the subsection providing that a specified offense against a minor 
will constitute a sex offense, nor is the word “element” present in the catch-all 
provision for what constitutes a specified offense against a minor.188  The court 
found the different language Congress used telling because it suggests that 
Congress intended “to cover a broader range of [conduct]” that constitutes 
 
181. United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 2015).   
182. Id. at 707. 
183. Id. at 709. 
184. See id. 
185. Id. at 704 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i) 
(2017))) (emphasis added). 
186. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(ii) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii) 
(2017))) (emphasis added). 
187. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(iii) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) (2017))) 
(emphasis added). 
188. Id. at 708. 
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specified offenses against minors than it did when it spoke to offenses 
containing “an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact.”189  What’s 
more, the court found that the statute’s use of the words “conduct” and by its 
“nature” in Section 20911(7)(I) was key as well—these words speak “to how 
an offense was committed,” requiring a court to consider the underlying facts 
of the offense instead of employing a bare element-to-element, categorical 
comparison.190  The court thus concluded that “[t]he text of 
SORNA . . . indicates that Congress intended that the broader circumstance-
specific analysis be applicable with respect to” the catch-all provision of what 
constitutes a specified offense against a minor.191  
With regards to SORNA’s purpose, the Fourth Circuit in Price found that 
Congress’s intent in enacting SORNA “also support[ed] the use of the 
circumstance-specific approach” in this case.192  Congress enacted SORNA to 
“protect the public [specifically, children] from sex offenders.”193  The 
provisions at issue in this case, involving specified offenses against minors, 
reinforced Congress’s purpose by using “broader language in defining a ‘sex 
offense’ for victims who are minors.”194  The use of this broad language shows 
that Congress sought to protect all children from sex offenders and that, to 
effectuate this purpose, courts should apply the circumstance-specific approach 
when determining whether a defendant’s conduct underlying a prior conviction 
was “by its nature . . . a sex offense against a minor.”195  
4.  The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Berry 
Like the Tenth Circuit in White, the Fourth Circuit has held it is appropriate 
to depart from the categorical approach to determine the age of a sex offender’s 
victim.  In United States v. Berry, a defendant who pleaded guilty to failing to 
register as a sex offender challenged the district court’s determination at 
sentencing that the defendant was a tier III offender.196  The district court had 
made this determination after examining facts underlying the defendant’s 
 
189. Id. at 704, 708. 
190. Id. at 709 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37–39 (2009)). 
191. Id. (citing United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
192. Id.  
193. Id.  
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 708 n.8; see id. at 709. 
196. United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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original conviction.197  In determining whether a categorical or circumstance-
specific approach was called for in this case, the Fourth Circuit examined the 
statutory text and concluded that the text called for courts to consider “the 
specific circumstance of the victim’s age” when determining an offender’s tier 
classification.198   
At first glance, it appears that the Fourth Circuit in Berry is entirely in 
agreement with the Tenth Circuit in White that age is the only fact a sentencing 
court may consider in SORNA cases.  
In sum, an examination of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)'s text and 
structure leads us to the same conclusion the Tenth Circuit 
reached in White: “Congress intended courts to apply a 
categorical approach to sex offender tier classifications 
designated by reference to a specific federal criminal statute, 
but to employ a circumstance-specific comparison for the 
limited purpose of determining the victim's age.”199   
That being said, a close reading of the case will show that the Fourth Circuit 
is only limiting itself to that fact with regards to one statutory section of 
SORNA, Section 20911(4)(A)200, which lists two of four generic crimes that 
render one a tier III offender under SORNA.201  Those generic crimes are 
“aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 
2242 of title 18)” and “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of 
title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years.”202   
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit discusses its prior 
opinion in Price and reaffirms the holding in that case, despite declining to 
extend the same approach to this section of SORNA.  As the court explains, it 
examined “a different, and differently-worded, SORNA subsection” in Price, 
namely 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I), defining the term “specified offense against a 
minor” as “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”203  
The court then quotes Price in restating that the “explicit reference to the 
‘conduct’ underlying a prior offense, as well as the ‘nature’ of that conduct, 
 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 197.  
199. Id. at 197.  
200. See id.  While the Fourth Circuit refers to 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A) in the text of the case, 
these provisions were transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 20911 a little over a year after the Berry decision came 
down.  See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2015).  
201. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A) (2017).   
202. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
203. Berry, 814 F.3d at 198 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I)). 
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refers to how an offense was committed—not a generic offense.”204  That 
reference to “conduct” thus allowed the Fourth Circuit to apply a circumstance-
specific approach in Price.205   
To put it another way, while some of the language used by the Fourth 
Circuit might suggest otherwise, the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Berry is 
distinguished from the Tenth Circuit’s holding in White.  While the Tenth 
Circuit (according to White) would only allow deviation from the categorical 
approach in SORNA cases for purposes of determining a victim’s age,206 the 
decision in Berry only limits courts in this manner in cases involving 28 
U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A), those cases where courts are trying to determine whether 
a defendant is a tier III offender by comparing his past offenses to generic 
offenses described in Section 20911(4)(A)(i) and (ii).207  The Fourth Circuit 
here simply held that the circumstance-specific approach could not be applied 
“wholesale” to the entirety of SORNA and that, “in some cases, one can and 
should determine whether a defendant was convicted of a sex offense without 
looking at the factual circumstances of the prior offense.”208  But when the 
situation is similar to that found in Price, which deals with other SORNA 
subsections that contain language that “refers to how an offense was 
committed,” rather than a “generic offense,” the circumstance-specific 
approach may very well be applicable.209 
5.  The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Rogers 
Particularly instructive for determining when to apply a circumstance-
specific analysis in SORNA cases is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Rogers.210  Rogers involved a defendant accused of sexually abusing 
his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter while that defendant, already a sex offender 
required to register under SORNA, was in failure-to-register status.211  He was 
subsequently convicted of incest in Indiana for that offense.212  Because the trial 
court found that the defendant committed a sex offense as classified under 
 
204. Id. 
205. Id.  
206. See United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015). 
207. See Berry, 814 F. 3d at 199; see also 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
208. Berry, 814 F.3d at 198–99. 
209. Id.  
210. 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015).   
211. Id. at 1234. 
212. Id. at 1236. 
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SORNA while in failure-to-register status, the defendant faced an enhanced 
sentence of over eight years incarceration and twenty years of supervised 
release.213  The defendant, however, argued that the “consensual sexual conduct 
… [with] an adult” statutory exception should apply to prevent his Indiana 
conviction from constituting a sex offense committed while he was in failure-
to-register status.214  He asserted that the court should apply the categorical 
approach to his statute of conviction, and that, because that statute did not 
contain a “consenting adult” exception similar to that in SORNA, Indiana 
criminalized a broader swathe of conduct than did its federal counterpart.215   
The Seventh Circuit examined the statutory language of SORNA to 
conclude that, contrary to the defendant’s assertion that the court must apply 
the categorical approach to the statutory exception at issue, that exception 
called for a circumstance-specific approach.216  Unlike the “threshold definition 
of ‘sex offense,’” which contained the word “element” and thus called for a 
categorical, element-to-element analysis, the statutory exception “use[d] fact-
specific language, strongly suggesting that a conduct-based inquiry 
applie[d].”217  This fact-specific language included “a string of fact-based 
qualifiers: ‘if the victim was an adult,’ ‘unless the adult was under the custodial 
authority of the offender at the time of the offense,’ ‘if the victim was at least 
13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the 
victim.’”218  The court held that these are all questions implicating the 
underlying facts of the offense rather than the elements.219  Thus, the court 
reasoned, whether the exception applied to the defendant’s conduct depended 
on facts such as whether the offense involved consensual sexual conduct 
between adults, and the only way for the court to determine if it did would be 
to apply the circumstance-specific approach to examine the facts of the 
 
213. Id. at 1235.  Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, if a defendant is required to register 
under SORNA, fails to do so, and then commits “a sex offense against someone other than a minor,” 
the sentencing court will apply a six-level sentence enhancement.  U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) (2016).  
With the combination of the defendant’s total offense level and his criminal history, he was facing 84–
105 months’ incarceration.  Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1235. 
214. Id. at 1236. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 1237. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C) (2017)). 
219. Id. 
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offense.220  “[T]he exception’s reference to conduct, rather than elements, is 
consistent with a circumstance-specific analysis.”221 
C.  The Increasing Reliance on the Circumstance-Specific Approach in 
SORNA Cases 
As illustrated by the cases surveyed above, federal courts are increasingly 
turning to the circumstance-specific approach in SORNA cases.  This allows 
sentencing courts to go beyond a bare element-to-element comparison between 
the defendant’s offense of conviction and those generic federal offenses falling 
under SORNA and instead permits courts to look to the facts underlying the 
conviction.222  
In the most narrow reading of the caselaw surveyed here, federal courts may 
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine (1) the age of the 
victim,223 (2) whether the underlying offense constituted a specified offense 
against a minor,224 and (3) whether either of the statutory exceptions for 
offenses involving consensual conduct apply.225  But the reasoning in the 
majority of these cases suggests a broader reading: that the circumstance-
specific approach should apply wherever the statutory language speaks in fact-
specific language that focuses on the defendant’s conduct rather than the 
elements of the prior offense.226   
In other words, there may be a circuit split emerging: the Tenth Circuit in 
White expressly concluded that it was only permitted to employ a circumstance-
specific approach to determine the age of a sex offender’s victim,227 while the 
reasoning and holdings of other Courts of Appeals in cases such as Dodge, 
Rogers, and Price do not reflect White’s more restrictive conclusion.228  Of the 
two approaches—the restrictive minority approach suggested in White and the 
 
220. Id. 
221. Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
222. See supra Section III.A–C 
223. See supra Section IV.A. 
224. See supra Section IV.B. 
225. See supra Section IV.B. 
226. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 
777 F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2015); Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1237; United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 
1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 
227. See United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015). 
228. See Price, 777 F.3d at 709; Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1236–37; White, 782 F.3d at 1135; Dodge, 
597 F.3d at 1356. 
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majority approach in the other cases surveyed—the majority seems more 
persuasive if we factor in the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Nijhawan v. Holder about when to apply the circumstance-specific approach 
as opposed to the categorical approach.229   
The key to the analysis then appears to be the use of “fact-based 
qualifiers,”230 or language discussing “how an offense was committed.”231  But 
as noted earlier, Nijhawan involved a civil deportation proceeding, a far 
different scenario than those where a court would employ a circumstance-
specific approach to determine whether a defendant’s prior offense meets the 
definition of a sex offense under SORNA.232  That distinction—the civil 
deportation proceeding vs. the criminal proceedings involved in these SORNA 
cases—is important from a constitutional law perspective, as criminal 
defendants are entitled to certain constitutional protections that civil defendants 
are not, such as those provided by the Sixth Amendment.  Therefore, an 
important question to ask is whether courts employing a circumstance-specific 
approach in SORNA cases are infringing upon the Sixth Amendment rights of 
the defendants in those cases. 
V.  ARE FEDERAL COURTS ENTITLED TO EMPLOY A CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC 
APPROACH IN SORNA CASES? 
As provided by the Supreme Court, courts should look to three factors to 
determine whether they should be employing a strict categorical approach when 
they are engaging in statutory comparison or conversely whether they may 
apply a circumstance-specific approach.233  Although these factors were 
discussed with regards to ACCA,234 they translate easily to SORNA scenarios 
and thus should be applied to determine which approach should be used in this 
context.  Therefore, the first factor examined is whether SORNA’s statutory 
text and legislative history lean in favor of employing one approach over 
another.235  Second, one must consider whether the “practical difficulties” of 
 
229. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009) (stating that the circumstance specific 
approach should be used when the statutory language “refer[s] to the conduct involved ‘in’ the 
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense”) (emphasis in 
original). 
230. Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1237. 
231. Price, 777 F.3d at 709. 
232. See supra Section III.C. 
233. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 267–71 (2013); Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990); see also, supra Section II.A. 
234. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01. 
235. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–69; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01. 
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requiring a circumstance-specific approach for certain issues would be too 
daunting for courts to overcome.236  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we 
must ask whether allowing courts to examine a criminal defendant’s conduct 
underlying his prior conviction, beyond the bare elements of that prior offense, 
infringes upon the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.237 
As is demonstrated in the analysis below, none of the current approaches 
used by courts for statutory comparison effectively reconcile the first factor, 
which leans in favor of allowing courts to employ the circumstance-specific 
approach in SORNA cases, with the latter two factors, which favor the 
categorical approach.238  
A.  SORNA’s Text and Legislative History 
Congress enacted SORNA “to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children, and in response to vicious attacks by violent 
predators.”239  In its declaration of purpose, SORNA also names seventeen 
victims of “vicious attacks by violent predators,” most of whom were under the 
age of 18 when their attack occurred,240 which seems to further suggest that the 
law is particularly concerned with preventing future attacks of that nature.  
Important to remember is that SORNA was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh 
Act, and the AWA was the culmination of over two decades’ worth of 
Congressional legislation aimed at protecting the public from the threat posed 
by sex offenders.241  Furthermore, to enforce its intent here, Congress also 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2250, a federal crime that could result in a sex offender’s 
imprisonment for up to ten years if that sex offender failed to comply with 
SORNA’s requirements.242 
In enacting the AWA and SORNA, Congress appeared especially 
concerned with the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders and believed that 
the best predictor of recidivism is, quite simply, a prior sex offense.243  It also 
 
236. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267, 270–71; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. 
237. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267, 269. 
238. See infra Section V.D. 
239. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017). 
240. Id. § 20901(1)–(17). 
241. See supra Part I. 
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016); see also Logan, supra note 6, at 434–35. 
243. See Logan, supra note 3, at 11; see also Smith v. Doe, U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (noting that 
“[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high’” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
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sought to establish a national registration system that would deter sex offenders 
from moving to states lacking things such as sex offender registries or 
community notification requirements.244  SORNA and the AWA, in addition to 
their predecessors, were enacted not in a vacuum but chiefly “[i]n response to 
a number of high-profile cases where egregious crimes were committed by 
individuals with prior sex offense convictions—but who were not required to 
register.”245 
As already noted, statutory language that refers to a defendant’s conduct in 
the commission of an offense, rather than the elements of that offense, suggests 
to a court that it should apply a circumstance-specific approach when engaging 
in statutory comparison.246  This conduct-based language can be indicated by 
presence of “fact-based qualifiers” or broader statutory language referencing 
how a crime was committed.247  The federal courts of appeals addressing this 
topic, many of which were surveyed above, appear correct then in reading 
several of SORNA’s provisions as requiring a circumstance-specific approach 
to determine some underlying fact of a criminal defendant’s conduct, whether 
it be the age of the defendant’s victim, whether the defendant committed a 
specified offense against a minor, or whether a statutory exception applies.248  
In other words, the statutory language examined by those courts surveyed does 
in fact speak in that conduct-based language which the Supreme Court stated 
would entitle courts to review a defendant’s conduct underlying a prior 
offense.249  Therefore, the statutory language of certain provisions of SORNA 
appears to permit a circumstance-specific analysis. 
In terms of determining Congress’s intent behind SORNA (or any other law 
it passes), the best indicator of that intent is the plain language that it writes into 
the statute.250  With regards to SORNA, Congress classified certain sex offenses 
 
244. See Malcolm, supra note 7, at 53. 
245. McPherson, supra note 11, at 1. 
246. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009). 
247. See supra Section IV.C; see also United States v. Rogers, 804 F. 3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 
2015) (explaining that the statutory exception embodied in 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017) “contains a string 
of fact-based qualifiers: ‘if the victim was an adult,’ ‘unless the adult was under the custodial authority 
of the offender at the time of the offense,’ ‘if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was 
not more than 4 years older than the victim’ . . . [t]his language doesn’t refer to elements of the offense; 
it refers to specific facts of the offense”).  
248. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777 
F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 
982, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 
249. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 39. 
250. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). 
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as falling within certain tiers; the more severe the sex offense, the higher the 
tier.251  In some instances, Congress distinguished the different tiers by 
distinguishing the age of the victim.252  In another provision, the catch-all, 
Congress provided that a sex offense requiring registration under the law 
includes offenses involving “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense 
against a minor.”253  Additionally, Congress provided statutory exceptions for 
SORNA’s requirements, writing that an offense is not a sex offense under 
SORNA if it involved “consensual sexual conduct” as long as the victim was 
an adult not “under the custodial authority of the offender,” or “if the victim 
was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than 
the victim.”254   
What seems quite clear from these provisions is that Congress was 
particularly concerned with child predators and sought to keep them on a 
shorter leash than other types of sex offenders.255  Seven of eight listed tier II 
offenses are sex offenses committed against minors or involving minors in 
some way.256  Moreover, two of the four listed tier III offenses are sex offenses 
committed against minors,257 while another cites to another statutory section 
that covers certain sex offenses committed against children.258  
 
251. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2)–(4) (2017). 
252. See id. § 20911(3)(A) (emphasis added) (classifying one as a tier II sex offender if he 
committed one of several listed offenses against a “minor,” i.e., a person under the age of 
18); id. § 20911(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (classifying one as a tier II offender if his underlying offense 
“involves . . . use of a minor in a sexual performance [or] solicitation of a minor to practice 
prostitution”); see also id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (classifying one as a tier III sex offender if he committed 
“abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years”); 
id. § 20911(4)(B) (classifying one as a tier III sex offender if his underlying offense “involves 
kidnapping of a minor”). 
253. Id. § 20911(7)(I). 
254. Id. § 20911(5)(C). 
255. Of note, the definition of a tier I sex offender is simply “a sex offender other than a tier II 
or tier III sex offender.” Id. § 20911(2). 
256. See id. § 20911(3).  These offenses run the gamut from sex trafficking of a minor to abusive 
sexual contact against a minor to “production or distribution of child pornography.”  Id.  The only tier 
II offense that does not specifically involve offenses against or involving minors is the last listed—one 
that “occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.”  Id. § 20911(3)(C).  This provision, like 
a similar one in § 20911(4)(C) which classifies one as a tier III sex offender if his offense “occurs after 
the offender becomes a tier II sex offender,” seems to embody Congress’s concern with sex offender 
recidivism. 
257. See id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii), (B). 
258. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(i) (as described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)).  
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All in all, Congress articulated its intent quite clearly through its statutory 
language: it “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenders against children as 
possible.”259  In several instances, Congress spoke in fact or conduct-specific 
language to effectuate this intent, classifying sex offender into different tiers 
based on things such as the age of their victims or the specific conduct 
underlying their convictions.260  Therefore, the text and purpose of SORNA 
lean in favor of permitting courts to engage in circumstance-specific inquiries 
with respect to those provisions speaking to the defendant’s underlying conduct 
or the facts of the conviction.  
B.  Practical Considerations 
Generally, applying a categorical approach is a much simpler endeavor than 
applying a circumstance-specific approach (or a modified categorical approach, 
for that matter) because all a court needs to do for the categorical approach is 
perform a one-to-one comparison between the elements of the statute of 
conviction and the elements of a generic federal offense.261  What’s more, the 
categorical approach “promotes judicial and administrative efficiency by 
precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after 
the fact.”262  In those cases where the Supreme Court held that a categorical 
must apply, it did so in part on the recognition that “sentencing judges have 
limited time, they have limited information about prior convictions, and—
within practical constraints—they must try to determine whether a prior 
conviction reflects the kind of behavior that Congress intended its proxy . . . to 
cover.”263  
A circumstance-specific approach, on the other hand, can be complex.  It 
requires courts to spend their already limited time and resources digging 
through sometimes inaccurate and sometimes quite old documents in search of 
some fact that will tell them what the defendants being sentenced actually did, 
rather than what they plead guilty to or were convicted of at an earlier date.264  
Such a process could prove quite cumbersome for sentencing courts.  And it 
would likely require these courts to establish some sort of process for getting a 
hold of a wide array of records such as guilty pleas, court transcripts, or 
 
259. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010). 
260. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)–(4), (7). 
261. See supra Section III.A. 
262. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2013). 
263. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
264. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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indictments to find the missing fact, some of which might only be available in 
paper form.265  This could prove difficult, for example, for a federal court in 
Delaware attempting to examine such records from a conviction that occurred 
in a Wyoming state court.  Therefore, this factor favors requiring a categorical 
approach rather than a circumstance-specific approach with respect to statutory 
comparisons under SORNA. 
C.  Sixth Amendment Concerns 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees all criminal 
defendants the right of a jury trial.266  What’s more, as the Supreme Court has 
held, any fact—other than that of a prior conviction—that increases a 
defendant’s penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for 
a crime must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.267  At the same 
time, however, the Supreme Court has also held that a judge may apply a 
penalty enhancer based on facts admitted by the defendant, such as those 
admitted in a guilty plea.268  But if Sixth Amendment protections are to be 
triggered, the penalty at issue must be punitive, or criminal, in nature.269  A 
purely “civil” penalty will not trigger Sixth Amendment protections.270 
When determining whether a penalty imposed by a statutory scheme 
demands Sixth Amendment protections (as well as other procedural rights 
afforded by the Constitution to criminal defendants), the threshold question is 
thus whether the penalty is civil or criminal in nature.271  To make this 
determination, courts will apply what’s known as an “intent-effects test.”272  
 
265. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125 (2009) (abrogated on other grounds by 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)). 
266. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
267. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (noting that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that 
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
268. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
269. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (stating that “the protections provided by 
the Sixth Amendment are available only in ‘criminal prosecutions’”).   
270. Id. at 253–55. 
271. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49; Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
272. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; see also Eric French, Comment, Dodging Due Process: How 
United States v. Dodge Pushes the Limits of Civil Regulation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 161, 169 (2011). 
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This requires first an examination of the legislature’s intent in enacting the 
statute—if it clearly intended for the penalty “to impose punishment,” then the 
statute is criminal.273  “If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory 
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the 
statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the 
legislature’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.”‘274   
Second, in assessing whether a regulatory scheme is so punitive as to render 
it criminal in nature, courts will apply a set of factors provided by the Supreme 
Court (the Mendoza-Martinez factors).  These factors include: 
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as 
punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
a scienter, whether its operation will promote traditional aims 
of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.275 
The Mendoza-Martinez factors are simply a “list of considerations,” and 
they are not intended to be either “exhaustive []or dispositive.”276  In other 
words, not all need be applied for court to find a law punitive or non-punitive.   
While the Supreme Court has not applied the intent-effects test to SORNA 
specifically, it has done so to a similar statutory scheme enacted in Alaska in 
Smith v. Doe.277   
1.  Smith v. Doe 
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that a statewide sex offender 
registration system was non-punitive.278  Smith involved a pair of sex offenders 
who—although convicted of their respective crimes, released from prison, and 
having completed rehabilitative programs before the passage of the law at 
issue—were nevertheless required to register as sex offenders by an Alaska sex 
offender registration and notification law.279  They challenged the law on Ex 
Post Facto grounds, arguing that the law constituted retroactive punishment, 
 
273. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
274. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). 
275. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
276. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.   
277. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–93. 
278. Id. at 96. 
279. Id. at 91. 
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and the Court therefore confronted the issue of whether this law was civil or 
criminal in nature.280 
After applying five of the Mendoza-Martinez factors,281 the Court 
concluded that the registration requirements of the Alaska law were not punitive 
and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.282  While 
this was an influential decision by the Supreme Court, it should be noted that 
the Court in Smith was only addressing whether that statewide law’s 
registration requirements were punitive; the Court openly stated that it was not 
addressing whether prosecuting a sex offender for failure to comply with those 
requirements was punitive.283  Since deciding Smith, and in the few instances 
where the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of sex offender 
registration laws, the Court has not addressed the constitutionality of either 
SORNA’s registration requirements or the federal criminal offense under 
Section 2250(a), which enforces those requirements.284  What’s more, over the 
years the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith has come under some 
criticism.285 
 
280. Id. at 91–92. 
281. See id. at 97–105 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).  
The Mendoza-Martinez factors applied in the Court’s analysis were whether the sanction at issue 
(mandatory registration of sex offenders) (1) had been historically regarded as punishment, (2) 
constituted an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promoted the traditional aims of punishment, 
retribution or deterrence, (4) was rationally related to the law’s non-punitive purpose, and (5) was 
excessive compared to its non-punitive purpose.  Id.  The Court found that the registration requirements 
did not resemble any historical forms of punishment enough to render it punitive, that it did not cause 
those subject to it to experience any more of a disability or restraint than they would have otherwise 
due to their criminal records, that any deterrent effects of the law were mere consequences of its stated 
purpose of protecting the public, that it was rationally related to that non-punitive goal of protecting 
the public, and that forcing sex offenders to register was not excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
goal.  Id. 
282. Id. at 105–06. 
283. See id. at 101–02 (noting that although “[a] sex offender who fails to comply with the 
reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure . . . any prosecution 
is a proceeding separate from the individual’s original offense.  Whether other constitutional objections 
can be raised, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this 
opinion.”). 
284. See generally Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that North 
Carolina’s registration law, which prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media, violated the 
First Amendment); Connecticut DPS v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (dismissing a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process challenge to a Connecticut registration law). 
285. See Logan, supra note 6, at 427–28; see also id. at 428, n.10 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (“The characterization [that the rate of recidivism for sex offenders is ‘frightening 
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2.  Assessing the Punitiveness of the AWA 
Does prosecuting and imprisoning a sex offender under Section 2250 for 
failing to comply with SORNA constitute “punishment” and thus trigger the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment for that sex offender?  Recall that the Sixth 
Amendment will not be implicated if the statute at issue is civil rather than 
punitive, or criminal, in nature.286  Therefore, to properly determine whether the 
sanction imposed is civil or criminal, we must apply the intent-effects test.287  
Again, the first step is to determine whether Congress clearly intended the 
statute at issue to be punitive.288  If so, then no further analysis is required—it’s 
punishment, and Sixth Amendment protections are triggered.289  But if 
Congress’s intent was to enact a civil statute, we must determine whether the 
law’s effects are so punitive to render it effectively criminal.290  The Mendoza-
Martinez factors provide a “useful framework” for analyzing the law’s 
effects.291 
But an important issue crops up before these tests can be applied: What, 
exactly, is the law that must be analyzed under these tests?  SORNA probably 
should not be analyzed alone because the defendant’s sentencing will be for a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), a separate statutory section.292  The question 
thus becomes whether the statute to be examined is simply § 2250(a) (i.e., the 
provision which makes a sex offender’s failure to register a federal crime), or 
if it is the entirety of AWA, including both SORNA (which provides the 
registration and notification requirements under the law293) and § 2250(a), in 
this circumstance.  
 
and high’], which has long served as a staple basis to justify SORN laws, was based on a 1986 article 
published in Psychology Today, in which the authors claimed that the recidivism rate of sex offenders 
was as high as 80%.  The assertion has since been abandoned by the article’s authors, and belied by 
social science research showing that while certain subgroups of sex offenders do recidivate at relatively 
higher rates, as a group sex offenders recidivate at considerably lower rates than many other criminal 
offenders.”); Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial 
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 508 (2015)). 
286. See supra Section V.C. 
287. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–93. 
288. See id. at 92. 
289. See id. 
290. See id. 
291. Id. at 97. 
292. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016). 
293. See SORNA, OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, 
REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, https://www.smart.gov/sorna.htm [https://perma.cc/9HWN-U7HU]. 
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While § 2250(a) is a criminal statute in the U.S. criminal code that carries 
with it the penalty of imprisonment,294 that statutory section remains one part 
of a broader statutory scheme—the AWA.295  Therefore, § 2250(a) should not 
be considered alone for the purposes of this analysis.  Importantly, § 2250(a) 
relies upon definitions provided by SORNA to give its elements effect.296  For 
example, an individual cannot be convicted under § 2250 unless he was first a 
sex offender required to register under SORNA, and to determine whether a 
defendant fits SORNA’s definition of a “sex offender,” one must consult 
another provision of the AWA, 34 U.S.C. § 20911, which defines a “sex 
offender” and the separate tiers of sex offenders for the purposes of SORNA’s 
registration requirements.297  Therefore, because § 2250(a) was enacted as 
Section 141(a)(1) of the AWA and is clearly part and parcel of a larger statutory 
scheme, it should be considered in light of the entirety of the AWA.298 
To reiterate, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe is not controlling 
on the issue of whether this statutory scheme is punitive.  First, Smith was only 
concerned with Alaska’s sex offender registry, not a national registration 
system like SORNA, and it came down three years before the AWA’s 
enactment.299  But more importantly, the Smith court only addressed the issue 
of whether the law’s registration requirements were punitive, specifically with 
respect to individuals whose sex offenses occurred before its enactment.300  It 
did not address whether prosecuting someone for failing to register under such 
 
294. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 369, 392 (2009). 
295. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA), Pub. L. 109–
248, § 141(a)(1), 120 Stat. 587, 602 (2006). 
296. An individual will violate 18 U.S.C. § 2250 if he meets three elements: (1) he is required to 
register as a sex offender under SORNA; (2) he travels across state lines or in foreign commerce “or 
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country”; and (3) after doing so, he knowingly fails to register or 
update his sex offender registration.  18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1)–(3); see also Kane, supra note 14, at 49. 
297. See generally 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017). 
298. See AWA, §141(a), 120 Stat. at 602.  This is an important point to make because, were 18 
U.S.C. § 2250(a) to be analyzed standing alone, it would unquestionably be punitive in both intent and 
effect.  Because that statute imposes the penalty of imprisonment upon anyone convicted of violating 
it and because it is situated in the U.S. criminal code, it is punitive on its face.  See Yung, supra note 
294, at 392–96 (arguing, contrary to my point, that § 2250(a) should be analyzed alone for punitive 
intent and effect); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (“If the intention . . . was to impose 
punishment, that ends the inquiry.”). 
299. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 89. 
300. Id. at 92. 
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a law was punitive—in fact, the Court expressly said that it was not addressing 
that issue.301  Therefore, we must apply the intent-effects test to determine 
whether prosecuting someone for failing to comply with SORNA’s registration 
requirements constitutes punishment and thus triggers Sixth Amendment 
protections for the defendant.302 
In terms of the statutory scheme itself, Congress stated, in the law’s 
“Declaration of purpose,” that it created “a comprehensive national system for 
the registration of [sex] offenders” “[i]n order to protect the public from sex 
offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks 
by violent predators.”303  That purpose resembles the purpose of the law 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Smith, which also involved “protecting the 
public from sex offenders.”304  And like the law at issue in Smith, the AWA 
established a registration system to further its stated purpose of protecting the 
public.305  Furthermore, like the AWA, the Alaska law in Smith had some of its 
provisions contained within the state’s criminal code, but the Court concluded 
that that did not “support a conclusion that the legislative intent was 
punitive.”306  It follows, then, that Congress’s intent behind enacting the AWA 
cannot be punitive simply because it placed provisions such as § 2250(a) in the 
U.S. criminal code.  As a result, it appears that Congress intended the AWA to 
be regulatory rather than punitive, but that does not end the inquiry; we must 
next consider whether the AWA, although regulatory in intent, is punitive in 
effect.307 
If one were examining simply the registration requirement imposed upon 
sex offenders by the AWA through SORNA, then one might reach a similar 
conclusion as the Court did in Smith v. Doe.  But if a statutory scheme operates 
to prosecute someone for a federal crime and sentences them to imprisonment, 
it looks significantly more criminal in nature than civil.  Three of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors clearly illustrate this. 
 
301. See id. at 101–02 (noting that although “[a] sex offender who fails to comply with the 
reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure, . . . any prosecution 
is a proceeding separate from the individual’s original offense.  Whether other constitutional objections 
can be raised, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this 
opinion.”). 
302. See French, supra note 272, at 168–71. 
303. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017). 
304. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting 1994 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 41, § 1). 
305. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (stating that “[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children,” Congress “establishe[d] a comprehensive national system for the 
registration of those offenders”). 
306. Smith, 538 U.S. at 95. 
307. See id. at 92. 
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First, the AWA imposes an affirmative disability or restraint upon sex 
offenders when it imprisons them for failing to comply with its registration 
requirements.  As the Court noted in Smith, when analyzing whether a law 
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint one looks to “how the effects of 
the [law] are felt by those subject to it,” and further, it stated that “the 
punishment of imprisonment . . . is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or 
restraint.”308  And if a sex offender is convicted under § 2250(a) of failing to 
register under SORNA, then he faces at minimum one year309 and up to ten 
years imprisonment.310  So thus far, this law looks like it imposes an affirmative 
disability or restraint when sex offenders are criminally prosecuted for failing 
to comply with it.  
But on top of imprisonment, sex offenders undoubtedly face other 
affirmative disabilities or restraints due to their status.  While the Court in Smith 
found that there was “no evidence that the [Alaska law] has led to substantial 
occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not 
otherwise have occurred,”311 there today exists plenty of evidence that sex 
offenders experience high rates of homelessness, housing instability, and 
problems finding employment as a collateral consequence of being a registered 
sex offender.312  Furthermore, registered sex offenders often are at increased 
risk of being targeted by vigilantism once their community is notified of their 
registration status.313  Although the Court in Smith argued that the consequences 
 
308. Id. at 99–100. 
309. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(e). 
310. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016). 
311. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. 
312. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1810–12 (2012); French, supra note 272, at 169–70; Joseph L. 
Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions, 40 
AKRON L. REV. 339, 350–55 (2007); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender 
Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–22 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia: 
Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 219, 222 (2015); Mary Helen McNeal & 
Patricia Warth, Barred Forever: Seniors, Housing, and Sex Offense Registration, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 317, 320 (2013); Stephanie N. K. Robbins, Comment, Homelessness Among Sex Offenders: A 
Case for Restricted Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
205, 222 (2010); Richard Tewskbury & Matthew B. Lees, Sex Offenders on Campus: University-Based 
Sex Offender Registries and the Collateral Consequences of Registration, 70 FED. PROBATION 50, 54 
(2006). 
313. See Alex B. Eyssen, Comment, Does Community Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the 
Eight Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism 
Resulting from Megan’s Law, 33 ST. MARY’S L. J. 101, 103–05, 115–17 (2001); Lara Geer Farley, 
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such as these stem “from the fact of conviction” rather than that law’s 
“registration and dissemination provisions,”314 it is clear that registration itself 
at least magnifies some of these difficulties.315  Thus, even without being 
imprisoned for failing to register, sex offenders face many negative collateral 
consequences as a result of the AWA’s requirements.  Overall, however, when 
the AWA operates through § 2250(a) to imprison a sex offender for up to ten 
years for his non-compliance with SORNA, it clearly constitutes an affirmative 
disability or restraint. 
Second, the sanction imposed on sex offenders who run afoul of SORNA’s 
registration requirements has historically been regarded as punishment.  As 
noted in Smith, “a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a 
means deemed punitive in our tradition.”316  The means selected by Congress 
when enforcing the AWA’s requirements against sex offenders is 
imprisonment, a sanction that our history and traditions have long considered 
punishment.317  As a result, when the AWA’s provisions result in the 
imprisonment of a sex offender who failed to comply with SORNA’s 
requirements, it is punishing that sex offender by traditional means of 
punishment. 
Third, the sanction imposed promotes the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence.  Unlike in Smith, where the Court found that 
deterrence was merely a byproduct of the registration requirement at issue 
rather than its focus, retribution and deterrence are clearly the purpose behind 
the penalties attached to the AWA for a sex offender’s failure to comply with 
SORNA.  A key purpose behind Congress’s creation of the failure to register 
crime in § 2250(a) was its concern over the risk posed by transient sex 
 
Note, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 
493 (2008); French, supra note 272, at 170; Jacob Frumkin, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 352 (2008). 
314. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101. 
315. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 313, at 491–94 (noting that the AWA’s registration 
requirements lead to sex offenders having difficulties finding housing and employment, and the 
community notification requirements results in offenders receiving threats, having their homes 
vandalized, being ostracized from their communities, and facing harassment and violence.  All of this 
can lead to sex offenders becoming homeless and transient, which may result in them failing to update 
their registration on time.).  
316. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. 
317. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) (“[W]e cannot doubt that at the present 
day imprisonment . . . is an infamous punishment.  It is not only so considered in the general opinion 
of the people, but it has been recognized as such in the legislation of the [s]tates and [t]erritories, as 
well as of Congress.”); Yung, supra note 294, at 397 (“In reviewing § 2250(a), . . . a court should 
recognize the rather obvious point that a sentence of up to ten years in prison is historically, 
traditionally, and currently regarded as punishment.”). 
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offenders, who could move freely from a state where they might be required to 
register to another with less stringent (or non-existent) registration 
requirements.318  Congress thus sought to deter this practice by punishing those 
sex offenders who engaged in it with imprisonment.319  Furthermore, the prison 
sentence an individual sex offender faces for a violation of § 2250(a) depends 
upon his tier classification, which is retributive in that it takes into account his 
prior sex offense(s) in sentencing them.320  And the sex offender’s tier 
classification will merely constitute his base offense level under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines321—he can have his sentence enhanced based on 
additional retributive sentencing factors such as his criminal history category.322  
As a result, enforcing the failure to register provision of the AWA against a sex 
offender promotes both deterrence and retribution. 
These three Mendoza-Martinez factors clearly indicate that while Congress 
may have intended to create a regulatory statutory scheme when it enacted the 
AWA, the law is effectively punitive when it is used to prosecute and imprison 
non-compliant sex offenders.  Therefore, sex offenders should be afforded 
Sixth Amendment protections when being prosecuted and sentenced to 
imprisonment under § 2250(a).  What’s more, different tiered sex offenders 
face different maximum penalties, with the maximum penalty increasing for 
each tier a sex offender moves up.323  This all suggests that courts, when 
determining sex offender tier levels for sentencing purposes, should refrain 
from making their determinations based any facts that have not been found by 
a jury or admitted by the defendant.324  As a result, Sixth Amendment concerns 
lean in favor of requiring courts to apply a categorical approach, rather than a 
 
318. See supra Section V.A. 
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016). 
320. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution rationale is 
that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”). 
321. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016). 
322. See id. § 4A1.1. 
323. See id. § 2A3.5(a)(1)–(3).  Recall that when considering base offense levels alone, a tier I 
sex offender faces a maximum of 16 months’ imprisonment, a tier II sex offender faces a maximum of 
21 months, and a tier III sex offender faces a maximum of 27 months.  34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(1)–(3) 
(2016).  Thus, the finding that a defendant is tier II or tier III sex offender, as opposed to a tier I sex 
offender, “indisputably increases the maximum penalty.” See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 
254, 269 (2013) (noting that such a finding “would (at the least) raise serious Sixth Amendment 
concerns if it went beyond merely identifying a prior conviction”). 
324. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 490 (2000).   
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circumstance-specific approach, when a court is sentencing a sex offender to 
imprisonment for a violation of § 2250(a). 
D.  Courts Should Apply a Restricted, Circumstance-Specific Approach in 
SORNA Cases 
Of the three factors examined above, the one that most strongly favors a 
circumstance-specific approach is Congress’s intent in enacting the law, as 
evidenced by SORNA’s text, structure, and legislative history.325  The practical 
concerns with the circumstance-specific approach, however, favor a categorical 
approach, which promotes judicial efficiency by limiting the time and resources 
sentencing courts expend on examining documents for missing facts.326  And 
generally speaking, employing a circumstance-specific approach to find facts 
that will ostensibly affect a sex offender’s ultimate sentence by slotting them 
into a particular tier raises Sixth Amendment concerns, which counsels against 
the use of such an approach in that scenario.327   
To address this divide, courts should employ a novel approach, a “restricted 
circumstance-specific approach.”  This approach would allow sentencing 
courts to examine certain facts underlying a defendant’s prior offense of 
conviction but in a way that respects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
and acknowledges the practical difficulties with requiring sentencing courts to 
engage in unrestricted fact-finding. 
In other words, even though two of the three factors examined here favor a 
categorical approach (or at least lean against an unrestricted circumstance-
specific approach), sentencing courts should not be required to employ a strict 
categorical approach when determining a sex offender’s tier classification.  
Doing so would run counter to Congress’s clear intent that sex offenders who 
committed crimes against minors face more stringent requirements under 
SORNA and more severe penalties when they violate these requirements.328  
This intent is evidenced both in Congress’s declaration of purpose that it sought, 
through this law, to protect the public, and minors especially, from sex 
offenders,329 and in its use of fact-specific language in distinguishing what 
crimes fall under what tier of sex offenses.330  From the language it employed 
in SORNA, Congress clearly intended to subject sex offenders whose criminal 
 
325. See supra Section V.A. 
326. See supra Section V.B. 
327. See supra Section V.C. 
328. See supra Section V.A. 
329. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017). 
330. See supra Section V.A. 
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history involved certain conduct committed against minors to higher scrutiny 
under this law, and it illustrated this intent by differentiating sex offenders tiers 
by reference to underlying facts such as their victims’ age.331 
What’s more, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence expressly allows a 
criminal defendant’s maximum penalty to be increased based on facts admitted 
by the defendant.332  Such facts, if they exist, can likely be found in any Shepard 
documents available from the prior conviction, such as a plea agreement, a plea 
colloquy, or “some comparable judicial record of this information.”333   
But an issue crops up here—these documents can generally only be 
consulted under the modified categorical approach, i.e., for the purpose of 
determining which of several “crimes” listed in a divisible statute the defendant 
actually committed.334  At the same time, however, the Supreme Court came to 
that conclusion in the context of ACCA after analyzing the same three factors 
addressed in this Section—the statute at issue’s text and legislative history, 
practical concerns with employing a circumstance-specific approach, and Sixth 
Amendment issues raised by the circumstance-specific approach.335  
Importantly, the statutory text and legislative history of ACCA is not the same 
as that of SORNA.  The Court even contrasted ACCA’s text with that other 
statutes where Congress had indicated its intent “to increase a sentence based 
on the facts of a prior offense.”336  SORNA is just that sort of statute, where 
Congress clearly sought to slot sex offenders into certain tiers—each with its 
own sentencing consequences—based on facts such as whether the offenders’ 
victims were under the age of thirteen or whether offenders’ crimes involved 
any conduct that was by its nature a sex offense against the minor.337  Unlike 
with ACCA, where Congress used language which suggested that it “intended 
the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been 
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories,”338  Congress used 
language in drafting SORNA that suggests it wanted courts to consider certain 
 
331. See supra Section V.A. 
332. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
333. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); see supra Section III.B. 
334. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263–64 (2013). 
335. Id. at 267. 
336. Id. at 267–68 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009)) (“If Congress had wanted 
to increase a sentence based on the facts of the prior offense, it presumably would have said so; other 
statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way.”). 
337. See supra Section V.A. 
338. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
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facts underlying prior convictions when determining sex offender tier 
classifications and subjecting those sex offenders to the sentencing 
consequences of their respective tiers. 
All the same, because the Sixth Amendment demands that courts cannot 
consider facts other than those found by a jury or admitted by the defendant 
when sentencing a sex offender under § 2250(a),339 sentencing courts should be 
restricted in what documents they may examine for making tier determinations.  
Unlike in the immigration context, sentencing courts here should not be 
permitted to examine documents such as police reports, pre-sentencing reports, 
and affidavits when trying to discover whether a sex offender’s victim was 
under the age of thirteen, for example.  Instead, they should be required to 
examine more reliable Shepard documents to try to find these facts.  If, for 
instance, a sex offender admitted in a plea deal or plea colloquy that his victim 
was twelve-years-old, then that is a factual admission within the bounds of the 
Sixth Amendment,340 and a sentencing court should be permitted to use that 
admission to declare the defendant a tier III sex offender and sentence them 
accordingly.  This unique, restricted circumstance-specific approach will thus 
give effect to Congress’s intent, as expressed through the statutory text and 
legislative history of SORNA, while at the same time respecting a defendant’s 
rights under the Sixth Amendment that no facts other than that of a prior 
conviction or those admitted by them will be used to increase the maximum 
penalty he would otherwise face for failing to comply with SORNA’s 
requirements. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Congress created SORNA to establish a national sex offender registration 
and notification system in the hopes that such a system would protect the public, 
and children in particular, from sex offenders.341  While courts should generally 
employ a categorical approach when engaging in statutory comparison, 
Congress’s use of fact-specific and conduct-focused language throughout 
SORNA indicates its intent that, for the purposes of determining a sex 
offender’s tier classification and sentencing them based on that classification, 
courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach that will allow them to 
examine the conduct underlying the sex offender’s prior conviction.342  Without 
such an approach, courts in many cases would not be able to examine such facts 
 
339. See supra Section V.C. 
340. See Blakey v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
341. See supra Section V.A. 
342. See supra Section V.A. 
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as the victim’s age or whether the underlying offense involved “any conduct 
that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”343  This may result in 
someone who would otherwise be classified as an upper tier sex offender to 
instead be classified as a tier I offender or, worse, not subject to SORNA’s 
registration requirements at all.344  This result would be counter to Congress’s 
intention that the law cover “as many offenders against children as possible.”345 
At the same time, prosecuting a sex offender in federal court 
under § 2250(a) for failing to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements 
clearly constitutes punishment, and such a prosecution would therefore trigger 
Sixth Amendment protections for the defendant sex offender.346  A sentencing 
court, therefore, should not be allowed to engage in an unrestricted fact-finding 
effort to determine which tier properly fits the conduct underlying the 
defendant’s prior offense.347  Rather, if the statutory language at issue suggests 
to a court that it may look beyond the bare elements of the prior offense to the 
conduct underlying that offense, Sixth Amendment concerns suggest that the 
court should look no further than those facts admitted by the defendant in the 
prior proceeding.348  This new approach, a restricted circumstance-specific 
approach, would thus serve to both acknowledge Congress’s intent behind the 
law and uphold the Sixth Amendment rights that all criminal defendants are 
guaranteed. 
JOHN F. HOWARD* 
 
343. See supra Section IV.B. 
344. See supra Section IV.B. 
345. See supra Section V.A. 
346. See supra Section V.C. 
347. See supra Section V.D. 
348. See supra Section V.D. 
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